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Of substantially equal importance is the factor of equilibrium. In our society
the judiciary is a powerful law-making agency. Traditionally, the legislatures
have left much of this law-making alone.4 One does not dare deny law-
making power to the judiciary without being sure that legislatures will in-
stantly move in to fill the void. In the constitutional field, moreover, one
dares not advocate abolition of judicial review without being sure that legisla-
tures will assume responsibility for preventing excesses in legislation. If all
this is true, the political scientist is forewarned not to tamper with judicial
power unless he is prepared to improve the legislative process at the same
time.
A final consideration is the dearth of factual knowledge about the legal
system. The judges and the lawyers deal in a verbal world, and it is not at
all clear that the legal system serves our ends as well as we think it does. It
may well be that if we could gather enough facts about the law-its administra-
tion as well as its substance in relation to the needs of our society-the evi-
dence of its inefficiency might be the key that would unlock the door to a new
approach to legal theory. If this is the key, Professor Cahill is probably no
more hopeful than I that reform is right around the comer. When all is said
and done, people worry about the things that lie behind the law; change
comes in the real world, and the law, reluctantly to be sure, toddles along
behind.
GEORGE D. Bn.AnENt
SECURITIES REGL ATION. By Louis Loss. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1951. Pp. xxvii, 1283. $17.50 (Student Edition, $10.00).*
By any standard, including the literary, Securities Rcgudation is an im-
portant achievement and a significant contribution to the crystallization and
development of the law.
Professor Loss' book is the product of three forces: his own first-rate
abilities as a scholar-and a scholar of unusual perception and style; fifteen
compensation, not by substantive legislation alone but by creating an administrative
agency to carry out the change.
4. Partly because, historically, common law judges in our unique system of judicial
supremacy have tended to maintain their judicial preserve through the medium of
judicial review; partly because lawyers, trained in the common law and its virtues, have
dominated legislatures.
t ember, Connecticut Bar.
*The principles of the Securities Act require the reviewer to disclose at least four
reasons why he should not have written this review: (1) reviewer and author are old
friends; (2) they shared together the pleasures of editing a justly celebrated volume
of this LAw JouaxA.; (3) they were colleagues for a time on the faculty of the Yale
Law School; and (4) the reviewer harbors some human emotions of chagrin at the
energetic tactics which resulted in transporting so strong a Yale man as Mr. Loss to the
banks of the Charles.
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years' experience on the legal staff of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission; and five successful years of teaching a lively seminar at the Yale
Law School called "SEC Aspects of Corporate Finance."' Securities Regu-
lation is a commentary on and an anthology of the teaching materials Profes-
sor Loss assembled for that pioneer course. His work is at once a "text" and
a "case book," to use familiar categories which are rapidly losing their older
meanings. It would be more accurate to identify it as a critical and fully
annotated essay on the major branches of financial law associated with the
work of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and of state agencies
regulating the issuance of securities. It will be as useful to the bench and bar
as it is to students, and to economists and historians as well as lawyers of all
kinds.
Securities Regulation brings into a single focus the dramatic advances
which twenty years of federal legislation and administration have accomplished
in American corporation law. Built on common-law ideas and responding
to the bitter experience of financial practices too often frenzied, the Securities
Act, the Securities Exchange Act, the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
the Trust Indenture Act, the Investment Company Act, the Investment Ad-
visers Act, and several related statutes 2 have transformed the environment of
American business and finance, and transformed it for the better. Despite the
political passions still evoked by the memory of President Roosevelt, it would
be difficult today to find a responsible person who advocated the repeal or
substantive weakening of these statutes, or a basic change in the pattern of
their interpretation and administration. The influence of this immense reform
in the law is pervasive. In the long run, perhaps its most important effect
will be the force of its example on the content of state corporation statutes
and the tenor of state court decisions interpreting them.
The bulk of Professor Loss' book consists of his thorough comment on the
background, legislative history, purposes, and application of the most impor-
tant features of this considerable body of legislation. While all the necessary
information is presented, the book is far more than a practitioner's encyclo-
pedia. The discussion of the separate topics considered is detached and ana-
lytical, and often illumined by wit and anecdote as well as sober thought.
While Professor Loss generally agrees with the SEC as against its critics,
when he treats specific controversies he is at pains to present the issues fully,3
and in ways which stimulate rather than terminate the debate. Here, as else-
1. Professor Loss' work as Visiting Lecturer at Yale was later supplemented and
paralleled by a similar course at the George Washington Law School. He is now Profes-
sor of Law at Harvard Law School.
2. Notably including § 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act and Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act. Securities Regulation considers not only the policy of the SEC, but of
the Federal Reserve Board in carrying out its responsibilities under the Exchange Act.
3. See, e.g., pp. 121-66 (the "cooling" period and its consequences) ; pp, 555-60 (ade-
quacy of statutes and rules regarding proxy regulation) ; pp. 578-9 (amendment of § 16
(b) of the Exchange Act) ; pp. 922-54 (stabilization).
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where in his book, the Socratic law teacher prevails over the faithful and
effective bureaucrat.
While Professor Loss is a man of firm opinions, he disciplines himself
closely in Securities Regulation. The book is more concerned with present-
ing the law as it has in fact developed than with alternative approaches and
possible reforms. Even on so obvious a matter as the confusion and burden
caused by the continued existence of state blue-sky laws, Professor Loss con-
tents himself with remarking that the "welter of diverse state laws makes one
almost literally scream for a uniform act-especially if he happens to be pre-
paring an issue for nationwide distribution." 4 After reviewing tventy years
of valiant effort to achieve coordination between federal and state practice,
and some uniformity among the states, he concludes merely that "it does not
detract from these achievements to say that they are all stopgaps. The clear
need is for one or more uniform acts properly coordinated with the federal
legislation."5 He does not examine the alternative possibility of exercising
the federal power to supersede and suspend state statutes in the field-a step
which could immeasurably simplify financial practice without weakening the
protection of investors. In this, as in other areas, multiple regulation by the
. states and the national government is a monument to the shibboleth, not the
reality, of federalism.
If the book has a shortcoming, it is that it does not go far into the economics
of the problems it considers.(; After all, one of the "findings" of fact included
in the Securities Exchange Act as demonstrating the necessity for the regu-
lation it provides is that
"National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment
and the dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which
burden interstate commerce and adversely affect the general welfare,
are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and
sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by exces-
sive speculation on such exchanges and markets, and to meet such
emergencies the Federal Government is put to such great expense as
to burden the national credit. ' 7
4. P.44.
5. P.48.
6. I do not mean to imply that the book is written in an ecunomic vacuum. Clear
and adequate descriptions are provided of the chief functions and practices of the securi-
ties industry and of its several component parts.
7. Section 2(4), Securities Exchange Act, 48 ST.NT. S81, SR2 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §7 1
(4) (1946). See also § 2(3) :
"Frequently the prices of securities on such exchanges and markets are sus-
ceptible to manipulation and control, and the dissemination of such prices gives
rise to excessive speculation, resulting in sudden and unreasonable fluctuations
in the prices of securities which (a) cause alternately unreasonable expansion
and unreasonable contraction of the volume of credit available for trade, trans-
portation, and industry in interstate commerce, (b) hinder the proper appraisal
of the value of securities and thus prevent a fair calculation of taxes uwing tv
the United Stafes and to the several States by uowners, buyers, and sellers of
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This idea was a natural if rather naive response to the shabby stories of fraud
and worse uncovered when the tide of the great bull market ebbed. In the
early Thirties it was perhaps plausible to believe that fraud, falsity, manipu-
lation, and overreaching should be eliminated not only because they should
be forbidden by any self-respecting system of law, but because their elimination
would usher in an era of stable prices and perpetual prosperity. But Section
2 of the Exchange Act goes beyond fraud to speculation itself. As a matter
of trade-cycle theory, the proposition it advances raises far-reaching questions
about the economics of speculation, both on the securities markets and the
commodities exchanges. Our laws discriminate against speculation in a variety
of ways: the six-months rule in determining what are capital gains for income
tax purposes; the regulation of short-selling; requirements designed to limit
extensions of credit for securities trading. and, under the Commodity Ex-
change Act, the possibility of imposing limits on actual price movements. 8
Professor Loss doesn't consider the theory which lies behind this attitude,
or its justification in fact. Yet the problem is one which requires analysis be-
fore one can really evaluate an important part of the law of finance.
It is hardly conceivable that in a dynamic and constantly changing economy,
where firms, industries, and regions rise and fall with spectacular speed, the
stability of particular stock prices is either desirable or possible. Nor would
general stability of the price-level of securities as a whole be more desirable,
so long as the level of profit fluctuates, and so long as interest-rates are shifted
both by market forces representing the interplay of thrift and productivity
and by Federal Reserve action designed to help stabilize employment. Against
this background, the first question is whether speculation as such, whether
"wholesome" or "excessive," helps or hinders the various markets of the
economy in carrying out their tasks. In one sense speculation is an indis-
pensable part of the mechanism of a free market. It should help make prices
anticipate economic developments and thus contribute to an economic alloca-
tion of the community's capital resources. But the law has a deep and ancient
bias against speculation as gambling. And, being optimists, Americans tend to
believe that if the market drops, it must be because a group of sinister gam-
blers has been selling the nation short. No doubt, as Keynes once said,
"Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of
enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the
bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development
of a country becomes the by-product of the activities of a casino,
the job is likely to be ill-done." 9
securities, and (c) prevent the fair valuation of collateral for bank loans and/or
obstruct the effective operation of the national banking system and Federal Re.
serve System."
8. 49 STAT. 1492 (1936), 7 U.S.C. §6a (1946). See Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 822
(1951).




But the real problem for the law is to reach some conclusions as to the im-
portance of the phenomenon and to devise standards which would protect the
economy against speculation which was genuinely "excessive" and harmful.
It may be that the position the law now takes is the height of wisdom:
somewhat to curb the ebullience of speculators without really making it im-
possible for them to carry out their function.' So happy a result, however,
would be a miracle of the legislative instinct responding empirically to prob-
lems as they emerge. One may hope that in his next edition, Professor Loss
would write a chapter of conclusions, dealing with this among other general
problems.
Professor Loss, however, is more directly concerned with the lawyers'
issues presented by statutory requirements of disclosure, prohibitions against
manipulation, trading on inside information, and like matters. These prob-
lems he examines with skill and insight, in the full setting of their historical
development, and of their comparative treatment in Canada, Great Britain,
and western Europe. In addition, he displays on almost every page, and even
in his footnotes, the gusto of a lawyer with a highly developed taste for the
human side of litigation. It would be churlish to ask for more.
EUGENE V. Rosvowt
MURDER, MADNESS AND THE LAw. By Louis H. Cohen. Cleveland: World
Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. 173. $3.50.
Tis is a book to be rent cover to cover. Its chief virtue is the relatively
slight number of pages. Yet in its small space more heinous murders are
committed and more horrid humans exhibited than in perhaps all the works
of Mickey Spillane or a year's subscription to True-Detective. The book was
executed by Louis H. Cohen (who is a psychiatrist) with the assistance of
Barbara Frank (who is the daughter of Judge Jerome Frank) and Thomas
E. Coffin (who is otherwise unidentified).
judge Frank's introduction starts the book off on the wrong foot by in-
sinuating it is a good book ("a new approach to the problem of the insane
murderer") and penning an adroit aphorism ("A society that punishes the
sick is not wholly civilized. A society that does not restrain the dangerous
madman lacks common sense.").' If Dr. Cohen had really gone on to reveal
to us how to separate the sick from the bad, the insane from the criminal, he
would have earned the gratitude of a society in fact deeply troubled over whom
to treat and whom to punish.
10. Thus Professor Loss, commenting on the effect of regulating short-selling under
§ 10(a) of the Exchange Act: "These rules [of the SEC] seem pretty well to have tal:en
the caffein out of the short sale." P. 682.
-Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. P. 9.
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